When Microsoft released MS17-010 in March 2017, they called it a “security update,” not a “critical patch.” Some organizations had automated systems that fast-tracked anything labeled “critical patch” but routed “updates” through standard change control processes requiring two weeks of testing and approvals.
Two months later, WannaCry ransomware hit those same organizations. Hard.
The semantic distinction between “patch” and “update” didn’t matter. The security impact did. But because teams had built processes around vendor terminology instead of actual risk assessment, they ended up prioritizing based on labels rather than threat severity. That mistake cost the global economy over $4 billion.
The uncomfortable truth? Vendors use these terms inconsistently, sometimes interchangeably, and often in ways that obscure rather than clarify what’s actually changing in your systems. Microsoft bundles security fixes into “Patch Tuesday” releases that also include feature updates. Apple calls everything “updates” regardless of whether it’s a critical zero-day fix or a new emoji pack. Adobe’s “updates” range from minor bug fixes to complete application overhauls.
So if we can’t rely on vendor terminology, what actually matters?
What Changes vs. What It’s Called
The industry has spent decades trying to create clean distinctions. “Patches are small and targeted. Updates are comprehensive and add features.” Sounds logical. Doesn’t reflect reality.
I’ve seen 2GB “patches” that rebuilt entire application frameworks. I’ve seen 50KB “updates” that fixed critical remote code execution vulnerabilities. The size, scope, and impact of a software change has almost no correlation with what the vendor calls it.
What actually determines how you should handle a software change:
Security impact: Does this address an exploitable vulnerability? Is it being actively exploited? What’s the CVSS score and, more importantly, is it in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog?
Operational risk: What systems does this affect? What breaks if the change fails? Can you roll back quickly? What’s your blast radius?
Urgency vs. stability tradeoff: Sometimes you need to deploy fast despite operational risk. Sometimes you can take time to test thoroughly. The decision depends on actual exploitation likelihood, not on whether it’s labeled a patch or update.
After dealing with the consequences of missing critical fixes because they were mislabeled, I’ve concluded that organizations need to stop building processes around vendor terminology and start building them around actual risk assessment.
The Reality of Vendor Terminology
Let me show you how inconsistent this gets:
Microsoft’s “Patch Tuesday” releases include security fixes, quality updates, driver updates, and feature enhancements—all bundled together. Some are labeled “Security Updates” despite including new features. Others are “Quality Updates” despite containing security fixes. The terminology tells you almost nothing about what’s actually changing.
Apple’s approach: Everything is an “update.” iOS 17.2.1 fixed actively exploited vulnerabilities—labeled an “update.” iOS 17.3 added new features—also an “update.” Same terminology, completely different security implications.
Linux distributions: A “package update” might be a security fix, a version upgrade with new features, both, or neither. You have to read the changelog to understand what’s actually changing, because the terminology won’t tell you.
Java’s “Critical Patch Updates” (CPUs) are comprehensive quarterly releases that include security fixes, bug fixes, and sometimes feature changes—so they’re updates despite being called patches, and they’re patches despite including non-security content.
These terminology inconsistencies cause real operational problems when organizations build automated workflows that treat “patches” and “updates” differently.
When Terminology Confusion Causes Damage
The Equifax breach in 2017 involved Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638. Apache released a fix as version 2.3.32 and called it an “update.” Some organizations filtered security notifications for the word “patch” and missed it. Others deprioritized “updates” because they assumed updates were feature releases that could wait.
143 days after the fix was available, attackers exploited the vulnerability. 147 million records exposed. $1.4 billion in costs. The fix was available the whole time—organizations just didn’t prioritize it because of terminology confusion and inadequate risk assessment processes.
Log4Shell in December 2021 presented a different problem. Apache released version 2.15.0 as the “patch” for CVE-2021-44228. Organizations that deployed 2.15.0 thought they were protected. They weren’t—the fix was incomplete. Apache released 2.16.0, then 2.17.0, transitioning from “patch” terminology to “update” terminology as the fixes became more comprehensive. Organizations tracking only “patches” missed the subsequent releases and remained vulnerable.
Evaluating Changes Regardless of Labels
Since vendor terminology is unreliable, you need a framework for evaluating software changes based on actual characteristics rather than arbitrary labels.
Three questions that matter:
- What’s the security impact? Check the CVE details, not just vendor severity ratings. Look at CVSS scores, but more importantly, check whether it’s in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog or being discussed in threat intelligence feeds. Active exploitation changes everything.
- What’s the operational risk? Has the vendor reported compatibility issues? Does this affect core business systems? What happens if it breaks? Is rollback tested and available? Some changes are low-risk to deploy even without extensive testing. Others require careful validation.
- What’s the urgency? If it’s actively exploited and you’re exposed, you deploy now and deal with potential issues afterward. If it’s a theoretical vulnerability in a system with compensating controls, you have time to test properly. The urgency depends on your specific exposure, not on whether it’s called a patch or update.
Organizations using platforms like Action1 evaluate urgency based on actual security impact and exploitability data rather than vendor terminology. That consistent risk assessment across all software changes—regardless of what vendors call them—is what automated vulnerability management should provide.
Decision Framework for Deployment
Most organizations have different processes for “patches” versus “updates.” Critical patches go through expedited change control. Updates wait for scheduled maintenance windows. This made sense when the terminology was consistent. It doesn’t work when vendors use terms interchangeably.
Better approach: Risk-based deployment tiers
Tier 1 – Deploy Within 24-48 Hours:
- Actively exploited vulnerabilities affecting your exposed systems
- CISA KEV catalog entries relevant to your environment
- CVSS 9.0+ with public proof-of-concept code available
- Zero-day vulnerabilities with observed exploitation
Process: Minimal testing, deploy to production, monitor closely, deal with issues as they arise. The risk of not patching exceeds the risk of breaking something.
Tier 2 – Deploy Within 7 Days:
- Critical vulnerabilities (CVSS 7.0+) not yet actively exploited
- Security fixes for internet-facing systems
- Fixes for vulnerabilities with public exploits but no observed widespread exploitation
Process: Basic compatibility testing, staged rollout starting with least-critical systems, expand if no issues. Balance speed against operational stability.
Tier 3 – Standard Maintenance Window (30 Days):
- Lower-severity security fixes
- Bug fixes affecting stability or functionality
- Non-security updates with beneficial features
Process: Thorough testing, coordinate with business units, deploy during scheduled maintenance windows with proper change control.
Tier 4 – Optional Deployment:
- Feature additions you don’t need
- Cosmetic changes
- Updates to applications being phased out
Process: Evaluate whether deployment provides value. Sometimes “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it” is the right answer.
Notice that none of these tiers depend on whether the vendor calls it a patch or update. The classification is entirely based on security impact and operational risk specific to your environment.
Handling Mixed Changes
Here’s where it gets really messy: vendors bundle different types of changes together. A security fix might come packaged with feature additions. A feature update might include critical vulnerability patches. How do you handle these mixed changes?
Security fix + feature addition: Deploy based on the security component’s urgency. If the security fix is critical, you deploy now even if you don’t want the features. You can disable or configure around unwanted features later. You can’t retrospectively fix a breach.
Multiple patches bundled into one update: This is Microsoft’s standard model—monthly rollups containing dozens of fixes. Evaluate the bundle based on its most critical component. If one fix in the rollup addresses active exploitation, the whole bundle becomes urgent.
Critical fix requiring major version upgrade: This is the worst scenario. The security fix is only available in a newer version that includes significant changes. Your options: deploy the upgrade despite operational risk, implement compensating controls while you prepare for the upgrade, or accept the vulnerability risk. None of these options are good—you’re choosing between bad alternatives based on your specific risk tolerance.
Solutions like Action1 handle these mixed scenarios by defining risk criteria once and applying them consistently regardless of how vendors package changes. You set rules like “anything with CVSS >8.0 and active exploitation = immediate deployment” and the platform enforces that regardless of whether it comes as a standalone patch or bundled into a quarterly update.
The Testing Trap
Most “best practices” documents tell you to test all patches and updates before production deployment. This sounds sensible until you’re facing an actively exploited zero-day on Friday afternoon.
The real best practice: test proportionally to risk.
For Tier 1 critical security fixes under active exploitation: Deploy to production with minimal or no testing. Monitor closely. If it breaks something, you fix it or roll back. But you deployed first because the exploitation risk exceeded the operational risk.
Unpopular opinion: Organizations that insist on two weeks of testing for every security patch never patch fast enough. By the time they finish testing, attackers have already exploited the vulnerability in other organizations and moved on to them.
For Tier 2 and 3 changes: Test appropriately in non-production environments. Validate compatibility with your key applications. Check for obvious breaking changes. But don’t test for months. Diminishing returns set in quickly.
For Tier 4 optional updates: Test thoroughly if you’re deploying them at all. Since they’re not security-critical, you have time to be careful.
The organizations that handle this well have automated testing frameworks that can validate basic functionality quickly. Action1’s approach to automated patch management includes staged rollouts—deploy to a pilot group, verify no issues, automatically expand to broader populations. This provides real-world validation faster than traditional lab testing.
Automation Is Not Optional Anymore
Managing software changes manually doesn’t scale. The average enterprise has 50+ critical security vulnerabilities published monthly that might affect their environment. Each requires evaluation, prioritization, testing, and deployment across thousands of endpoints.
Manual processes can’t keep pace with that volume while maintaining consistency. You end up with:
- Different teams interpreting vendor terminology differently
- Inconsistent prioritization based on who’s doing the assessment
- Updates falling through cracks because someone assumed another team handled it
- Delayed deployments because manual processes are slow
Platforms like Action1 provide unified workflows for managing both patches and updates through consistent risk-based criteria. You define what matters to your organization once—security impact thresholds, operational risk tolerance, compliance requirements—and the platform applies those rules across all software changes regardless of vendor labels.
The value isn’t just speed (though going from 30+ days to under 7 days average time-to-patch matters enormously). It’s consistency. Automated systems don’t get confused by terminology. They evaluate actual CVE data, exploitation status, and your environment specifics, then make deployment decisions based on your defined criteria.
Third-Party Application Complexity
Operating system vendors at least try to maintain some consistency in their terminology. Third-party applications are the Wild West.
Java calls them “Critical Patch Updates.” Adobe calls them “updates.” Chrome calls them “updates” but pushes them automatically. Various open-source projects use “releases,” “patches,” “security updates,” and “point releases” interchangeably.
When you’re managing hundreds of applications across thousands of endpoints, this terminology chaos becomes unmanageable without automation. You can’t build separate processes for each vendor’s terminology quirks.
Action1’s vulnerability management framework treats security fixes with equal urgency whether Microsoft labels them “patches” or “updates,” whether Adobe calls them “updates” or Chrome pushes them automatically. The consistent risk assessment across all third-party applications is what makes comprehensive vulnerability management possible.
Measuring What Matters
Most organizations track patch compliance—percentage of systems with latest patches installed. This metric is almost useless because it doesn’t account for:
- Which patches actually matter for your security posture
- How quickly you deployed them after release
- Whether you’ve addressed actively exploited vulnerabilities
- The security impact of what’s missing
Better metrics:
Mean Time to Remediate (MTTR) for Critical Vulnerabilities: Time from CVE publication to deployment completion for CVSS >8.0 vulnerabilities. Target: <7 days, ideally <72 hours.
Exposure to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities: Number of systems vulnerable to entries in CISA’s KEV catalog. Target: Zero, always.
Critical Asset Patch Coverage: Percentage of internet-facing systems and critical infrastructure current on security fixes. Target: 98%+.
Vulnerability Window by Severity: Time systems remain vulnerable to different severity levels. Track separately for critical, high, medium severity.
These metrics measure actual security posture regardless of whether vendors called the fixes “patches” or “updates.” They tell you whether you’re reducing risk, not just whether you’re deploying vendor-labeled patches.
Your Software Change Evaluation Checklist
Stop asking “is this a patch or an update?” Start asking these questions:
Security Impact Assessment:
- Is this in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog? (If yes, deploy immediately)
- What’s the CVSS score and what specifically is the vulnerability? (Understand actual risk)
- Are there public exploits available? (Check Metasploit, GitHub, security forums)
- Does this affect systems exposed to untrusted networks? (Internet-facing = higher priority)
- What’s the exploitability—local access required or remote unauthenticated? (Remote = more urgent)
Operational Risk Assessment:
- Has the vendor reported any known issues with this release? (Check release notes thoroughly)
- What systems does this affect and what’s the blast radius if it breaks? (Scope the risk)
- Is rollback tested and available? (Verify before deploying)
- Are there dependencies that must be updated simultaneously? (Understand the full scope)
- Do we have compensating controls if deployment is delayed? (Risk mitigation options)
Deployment Decision:
- Based on security impact and operational risk, which tier does this fall into? (Apply framework)
- What’s the deployment timeline—immediate, 7-day, standard maintenance window? (Set expectations)
- Who needs to be notified and what coordination is required? (Communication plan)
- What monitoring will verify successful deployment? (Validation strategy)
- What’s the rollback trigger—what issues would cause us to revert? (Decision criteria)
Post-Deployment:
- Did deployment complete successfully across all targeted systems? (Verify coverage)
- Are there any error reports or unexpected behavior? (Monitor closely)
- Should this inform our processes for similar future changes? (Continuous improvement)
When Vendors Make It Worse
Sometimes vendors actively obscure what’s changing through poor communication. I’ve seen release notes that say “various security improvements” without listing CVEs. I’ve seen “minor bug fixes” that actually patched remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. I’ve seen “feature updates” that included zero-day fixes.
When vendor communication is unclear:
- Assume higher risk until proven otherwise
- Check third-party vulnerability databases directly
- Look for security advisories from other sources
- Deploy cautiously with enhanced monitoring
If a vendor consistently provides poor release documentation, consider whether you want to keep using their software. Poor security communication is a red flag for poor security practices overall.
The Bottom Line
The distinction between “patches” and “updates” matters less than understanding what’s actually changing in your software and what that means for your security posture.
Build your processes around risk assessment and security impact, not around vendor terminology. Evaluate every software change based on its actual characteristics—what vulnerabilities it addresses, what systems it affects, what risks it carries, how urgently you need to deploy it.
Use automation to maintain consistency across the hundreds of software changes you handle monthly. Manual processes can’t scale and can’t maintain the speed modern threats require.
And remember that the goal isn’t perfect compliance with vendor update schedules. The goal is reducing your vulnerability window—the time between when a fix becomes available and when you’ve deployed it to systems that need it.
Organizations that do this well don’t obsess over whether something is technically a patch or an update. They focus on closing security gaps fast while managing operational risk intelligently. That’s the practice that actually reduces breach likelihood—not semantic perfection about vendor terminology.
About Action1
Action1 is an autonomous endpoint management platform trusted by many Fortune 500 companies. Cloud-native, infinitely scalable, highly secure, and configurable in 5 minutes—it just works and is always free for the first 200 endpoints, with no functional limits. By pioneering autonomous OS and third-party patching with peer-to-peer patch distribution and real-time vulnerability assessment without needing a VPN, it eliminates routine labor, preempts ransomware and security risks, and protects the digital employee experience. In 2025, Action1 was recognized by Inc. 5000 as the fastest-growing private software company in America. The company is founder-led by Alex Vovk and Mike Walters, American entrepreneurs who previously founded Netwrix, a multi-billion-dollar cybersecurity company.
